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The Social Value of Academic Freedom Defended 
J. PETER BYRNE* 
In his recent book, Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to 
Revolution,1 Stanley Fish renewed his arguments for an “it’s just a job” account of 
academic freedom, begun in his 2008 book, Save the World on Your Own Time.2 He 
claims that academic freedom consists of nothing more than the conditions necessary 
to follow the established criteria for scholarship and teaching within each discipline.3 
He complains chiefly against the invocation of academic freedom to protect or 
glorify political advocacy by academics.4 There is a lot in Fish’s account to admire 
and agree with. The appropriate sphere of academic freedom needs to be 
distinguished from general First Amendment rights enjoyed by public employees and 
from substandard teaching or scholarship, which can and should be sanctioned.5 But 
he also continues to deny that academic freedom fosters any important public values 
broader than the interests of academics themselves, a position I view as both 
incoherent and disastrous for the preservation of academic freedom.  
Fish’s new book expressly disagrees with criticisms I have offered of his 
arguments in the past.6 While a parochial dispute between Fish and me hardly merits 
a reader’s time, our disagreement raises squarely the social value of academic 
freedom, a value emphatically affirmed by the American Association of University 
Professors’ seminal 1915 Statement,7 which is the single most important document 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  
 1. STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO 
REVOLUTION (2014). 
 2. STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME (2008).  
 3. Id. at 81 (“My deflationary definition of academic freedom is narrowly professional 
rather than philosophical, and its narrowness, I contend, enables it to provide clear answers to 
questions . . . blurred by more ambitious definitions.”). 
 4. In Versions of Academic Freedom, Fish presents, as an illustrative case study, an email 
sent by a professor to his students in a class on the sociology of globalization, condemning in 
strong terms the Israeli occupation of Gaza. FISH, supra note 1, at 8–9. Fish concludes:  
What was inappropriate was [the professor’s] treating the topic not as a matter of 
academic study but as the occasion for parading a political judgment that 
immediately became the course’s orthodoxy. . . . Inquiry the conclusion of which 
is ordained before it begins is not academic; it is something else, and because it 
is something else it does not deserve the protection of academic freedom.  
Id. at 18.  
 5. See infra notes 11–24 and accompanying text. I have addressed these issues in a series 
of articles dating back twenty-five years, beginning with J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom, 
A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989). This Article will not 
engage with the issue of how constitutional academic freedom should be conceptualized 
legally, but the reader should know that I advocate that constitutional academic freedom 
protect primarily the good faith academic decisions of universities, so long as they incorporate 
appropriate peer review. See id. at 311–39.  
 6. See J. Peter Byrne, Neo-orthodoxy in Academic Freedom, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 143, 161
–63 (2009) (reviewing MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: 
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2009) and FISH, supra note 2). 
 7. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 
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on academic freedom in the United States and the subject of the panel discussion for 
which this essay was prepared.8 But the social value of academic freedom is now 
perhaps more questioned than at any time since before World War II. This essay 
attempts to further defend and clarify the social value of academic freedom and offer 
some examples of its vital role in preserving a liberal polity.  
Fish and I agree about the core meaning of academic freedom: faculty members 
should be largely free in pursuing their scholarship and teaching subject only to 
evaluation on academic grounds and primarily by peers.9 Academic freedom, as 
described in the 1915 Statement, differs significantly from a general right of free 
speech. The authors of the 1915 Statement tied appropriate freedom to the function 
of academic work: 
[Professors require] freedom to perform honestly and according to their 
own consciences the distinctive and important function which the nature 
of the profession lays upon them.  
That function is to deal at first hand, after prolonged and specialized 
technical training, with the sources of knowledge; and to impart the 
results of their own and of their fellow-specialists’ investigations and 
reflection, both to students and to the general public, without fear or 
favor.10 
Thus, the essence of academic work is the careful employment of intellectual 
methods appropriate to a discipline and the subjecting of such work to evaluation and 
criticism by disciplinary peers. The threat to academic work comes from interference 
by nonacademics, whether trustees or government officials. Such interference derails 
peer consideration and debate of new work, frustrating the sorting of truth from error, 
or of accounts that more fully fulfill disciplinary ideals from those that do so less 
successfully.  
The special character of academic freedom can be seen in contrast to the general 
right of free speech enjoyed by all citizens. The core of free expression is that the 
government cannot penalize speakers for the content of their speech regardless of 
how socially pernicious or inane it may seem.11 But within the system of academic 
                                                                                                                 
 
General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1 BULL. AM. 
ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 15 (1915). 
 8. The panel was held on January 4, 2015, at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Association 
of American Law Schools. It was entitled “Academic Freedom for the Next 100 Years,” and 
reflected on the continuing relevance of the 1915 Statement. The panel followed immediately 
after Dean Robert Post’s luncheon speech. Robert C. Post, Dean, Yale Law Sch., Academic 
Freedom and Legal Scholarship, Address Before the Association of American Law Schools 
2015 Annual Meeting (Jan. 4, 2015). 
 9. “What is crucial is . . . whether the classroom, the research laboratory, personnel 
decisions, and curricular decisions are insulated from the illegitimate pressures brought to bear 
by donors, grantors, and political operatives.” Fish, supra note 1, at 41.  
 10. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 7, at 25.  
 11. The Supreme Court has repeatedly proclaimed that “above all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92, 95 (1972). 
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freedom, it is commonplace that faculty can be penalized when peers judge that their 
scholarship or teaching fall below professional standards:12 judgments that First 
Amendment cases in other contexts condemn as “content discrimination.”13 Indeed, 
without this collective judgment, the distinctive value of scholarship as tested 
knowledge, the systematic efforts to distinguish truth from falsehood and better from 
weaker normative judgments, would be lost.14 Our scholarship would essentially 
resemble blog posts, but with more footnotes. Academic freedom protects this 
disciplined system of scholarship and teaching.  
A vivid example of this distinction is presented by the actions of the University 
of Colorado against Ward Churchill, then a tenured professor and chair of the Ethnic 
Studies Department at that school, after he made himself notorious by writing a 
nonacademic essay comparing the victims of the World Trade Center destruction to 
Adolph Eichman, a chief manager of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany, who was 
executed as a war criminal.15 A faculty committee that investigated the case 
concluded that Churchill’s writings on this subject were protected against reprisal by 
the First Amendment.16 That seems right, because the First Amendment generally 
protects against employer reprisals for the nonprofessional speech of all public 
employees, not just professors, when they speak as citizens on a matter of public 
importance.17 This aspect of the First Amendment, in my view, is entirely distinct 
from academic freedom, which deals only with what might be called professional 
speech, primarily teaching and scholarship.18  
However, the same faculty investigation surfaced allegations that Churchill had 
otherwise committed egregious acts of academic fraud in his scholarship. A different 
faculty committee investigated and found several serious instances of academic 
fraud.19 The chancellor of the university issued a notice to dismiss Churchill for cause 
and an evidentiary hearing, at which Churchill, as represented by counsel, was held 
before the Faculty Senate Committee on Privilege and Tenure. The Committee 
unanimously found that the university had shown by clear and convincing evidence 
that Churchill’s academic conduct fell below the minimum standards for academic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See Byrne, supra note 5, at 258–59.  
 13. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 
(1995). 
 14. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE, 61–68 (2012).  
 15. Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 285 P.3d 986, 991 (Colo. 2012) (en banc).  
 16. Id. at 992. 
 17. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens 
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that 
statements made by public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First 
Amendment protection). 
 18. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 163–70.  
 19. “Among the violations that the committee found Churchill had committed were 
falsification, fabrication, plagiarism, failure to comply with established standard regarding author 
names on publications, and a ‘serious deviation from accepted practices in reporting results from 
research.’” Scott Jaschik, The Ward Churchill Verdict, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (May 16, 2006), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/05/16/churchill [https://perma.cc/6HWD-CE9Q]. 
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integrity.20 Although a bare majority of the committee recommended a lesser penalty, 
the university terminated Churchill’s employment.21 
Churchill sued, claiming his dismissal was a violation of the First Amendment, 
arguing essentially that his termination was retaliation for his constitutionally 
protected speech. A jury found for Churchill but awarded him only one dollar 
nominal damages; the judge denied all equitable remedies, including reinstatement.22 
Churchill pursued an appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, which affirmed.23 The 
court rejected the claims of retaliatory investigation on the grounds that the Regents 
of the University enjoyed qualified immunity, so they could not be held liable for an 
action that was not clearly unconstitutional.24  
The Churchill saga illustrates two important principles. First, it well illustrates the 
sharp distinction between the protections offered by the First Amendment to a faculty 
member’s speech outside their scholarship and teaching, and the role of academic 
freedom in protecting the truth values of scholarship. When speaking informally on 
a matter of public concern, Churchill could rely on robust constitutional protections 
regardless of how reckless or idiotic his views were. But his scholarly work could be 
held to reasonable standards of honesty and professional care as determined by his 
academic peers. Not only does enforcement of such academic norms by a university 
not violate the First Amendment, but in my view, such institutional action on 
academic grounds is protected by the First Amendment. Academic freedom is an 
essential component of the institutional organization of learning and scholarship; it 
promotes the reliability of scholarship through balancing individual professional 
creativity and collective scrutiny. I have long argued that the First Amendment 
should safeguard academic freedom by shielding good faith academic judgments by 
universities against interference from other governmental actors.25 While the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. “[The] report found that Churchill had committed three acts of evidentiary fabrication 
by ghostwriting and self-citation, two acts of evidentiary fabrication, two acts of plagiarism, 
and one act of falsification in his academic writings.” Churchill, 285 P.3d at 993–94.  
 21. Id. at 994. 
 22. Id. at 996.  
 23. The Supreme Court described the trial judge’s reasoning on reinstatement before 
affirming:  
The trial court reasoned that forcing the University to reinstate Churchill would 
result in a substantial distraction that would negatively impact the University’s 
core mission to educate its students and advance academic and scientific 
research. In his trial testimony, Churchill stated that he disagreed with the 
University’s standards of scholarship. The trial court found that this made it 
especially likely that reinstatement would only serve to risk further instances of 
academic misconduct. 
Given that the University committees that investigated Churchill found that 
he had engaged in repeated, flagrant acts of academic misconduct and dishonesty, 
the trial court also stated that reinstatement would greatly undermine the 
University’s efforts to hold its students and faculty to the highest standards of 
personal and academic integrity. 
Id. at 1008. 
 24. Id. at 1009–11.  
 25. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting 
Real About the “Four Freedoms” of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929 (2006); Byrne, 
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Colorado courts did not explicitly invoke a First Amendment privilege of 
institutional academic freedom, its more technical holdings embody deference to the 
university’s academic judgment, based on peer review, and the safeguarding of the 
integrity of scholarship.  
Integral to any discussion of why or how the First Amendment protects this 
collective system of expression peculiar to highly educated faculty members must be 
an understanding of its value to society at large. The eminent drafters of the 1915 
Statement had little doubt about the value of academic freedom: they saw scholarly 
methods producing new knowledge and fostering habits of thought necessary for 
social progress.  
An inviolable refuge from [the] tyranny [either of an autocratic ruler 
or of public opinion] should be found in the university. It should be an 
intellectual experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and 
where their fruit, though still distasteful to the community as a whole, 
may be allowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it may become a part of 
the accepted intellectual food of the nation or of the world. Not less is it 
a distinctive duty of the university to be the conservator of all genuine 
elements of value in the past thought and life of mankind which are not 
in the fashion of the moment. . . . One of its most characteristic functions 
in a democratic society is to help make public opinion more self-critical 
and more circumspect, to check the more hasty and unconsidered 
impulses of popular feeling, to train the democracy to the habit of looking 
before and after.26 
The drafters thus relied upon a capital “P” Progressive faith in the value of 
disinterested, expert analysis for democratic governance. Despite several waves of 
postmodern skepticism, the kernel of this view still prevails within a pragmatic and 
ethical epistemology.27 Disciplinary knowledge provides society its most reliable 
pool of knowledge about the natural and social world. I cannot determine whether 
smoking causes cancer by looking at cigarettes; I need to rely on the tested inquiries 
of scientists. This is true even though, and even because, disciplinary knowledge 
remains subject to critique and revision. The capacity of the university to generate 
such reliable knowledge provides the basis for the social value of academic freedom. 
A liberal society needs to appreciate and act upon the difference between knowledge 
and opinion, a striving that goes back at least to Socrates. Robert Post has given a 
sophisticated contemporary rendition of this claim: “Democratic competence refers 
to the cognitive empowerment of persons within public discourse, which in part 
depends on their access to disciplinary knowledge. Cognitive empowerment is 
necessary both for intelligent self-governance and for the value of democratic 
                                                                                                                 
 
supra note 5, at 311–17, 331–39; see also Aziz Huq, Easterbrook on Academic Freedom, 77 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1055, 1066–67 (2010) (“[T]he persistence of the university as a going 
intellectual concern rests partially on sustained and committed application of professional 
standards.”).  
 26. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 7, at 32.  
 27. See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 
79, 124–29 (2004); David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Post-Modernism?, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 1377 (1998) (book review).  
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legitimation.”28 By contrast, Stanley Fish rejects any attempt to justify academic 
freedom on any values extrinsic to the academy: “[A]cademics do not set out to aid 
democracy or help build the economy or produce good citizens; these things may 
contingently happen, but achieving them is not the point. . . . [T]hey cannot be cited 
as the justification for an activity that did not have them in contemplation.”29  
Admitting that his views are “deflationary,”30 Fish criticizes Post and me, among 
others, for arguing that academic freedom supports democracy.31 Central to Fish’s 
academic “minimalism”32 seems to be an epistemological skepticism that, he thinks, 
renders obsolete the 1915 Statement’s claim that academic freedom advances the 
public interest by providing expertise for public decision making. In essence, he fears 
that the distance between any given disciplinary standard of quality and an external 
criterion of truth or reason leaves academic freedom vulnerable to dissolution into 
mere politics.33 While admiring many aspects of Fish’s writing on academic freedom, 
I believe, and have written, that here he is dangerously wrong.34 Academic freedom 
is essential to a liberal society and deserving of constitutional protection because 
scholarship and teaching governed by disciplinary norms represents modernity’s best 
secular effort at separating truth from falsehood.  
Before pursuing more abstract arguments, let’s consider a recent example. The 
value of academic freedom to governance can be seen clearly within a topic of 
importance: climate change. Notoriously, loud voices still deny that humans are 
contributing crucially to global warming, despite the scientific consensus that human 
activity, primarily the emission of carbon, methane, and other so-called greenhouse 
gases, contributes importantly to an unprecedented rise in global temperatures, with 
consequences that may be disastrous for many human societies.35 A few deniers are 
scrupulous skeptics, but most speak out of ignorance or the meretricious protection 
of vested interests.36 That’s all part of the difficult, predictable politics of climate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. POST, supra note 14, at 33–34. A pithier expression lies in the well-known aphorism 
of Daniel Patrick Moynihan: “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion but not to his own facts.” 
Steven R. Weisman, Introduction to DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, DANIEL PATRICK 
MOYNIHAN: A PORTRAIT IN LETTERS OF AN AMERICAN VISIONARY 2 (Steven R. Weisman ed., 
2010). 
 29. FISH, supra note 1, at 48.  
 30. Id. at 20. 
 31. “An argument like Post’s or Byrne’s succeeds in doing that [i.e., persuading 
nonacademics that academic privileges make sense] but ends up abandoning an internal 
justification of academic freedom, a justification that flows from the nature of the task rather 
than from the contribution the task makes to other tasks.” Id. at 49.  
 32. Id. 
 33. FISH, supra note 2, at 157–58; see also STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS 
FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 238–42 (1994). 
 34. Byrne, supra note 6, at 157–58.  
 35. See generally 2014 State of the Climate: Highlights, CLIMATE.GOV (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/2014-state-climate-highlights 
[https://perma.cc/4C7U-DNEA] (providing links to summaries of the present scientific 
conclusions regarding topics such as “carbon dioxide” and “sea level”).  
 36. See, e.g., Douglas Fischer, “Dark Money” Funds Climate Change Denial Effort, SCI. 
AM. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dark-money-funds-climate
-change-denial-effort/ [http://perma.cc/8H8S-HDYG]. Recent investigations have shown the 
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change, reflecting the large changes in social behavior and economic distribution that 
a large reduction of emissions will entail. What gives one hope is the patient work of 
independent, largely academic scientists working toward the best understanding of 
how the atmosphere and oceans are changing and why. Method and peer review are 
essential, as can be seen in the careful procedures for reports by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.37  
The value of this work for society to understand what is happening and how to 
address it seems palpable. This is not just a story about academic disciplines 
following their own protocols just because they do, but about methods of 
investigation that aim to, and do, give us the best understanding of complex 
phenomena that actually exist in the world and will impact the future of humanity. It 
is significant that the scientists examining climate change work in several disciplines, 
and their work is subject to critique within each discipline, but the composite of their 
work creates overall understanding of climate change and has social value quite 
beyond the mores of each discipline.  
Entrenched interests have sought to diminish this consensus by claiming that 
scientists are making it up to enhance their research budgets, as was charged in the 
so-called Climategate episode, a media-generated scandal that cast no reasonable 
doubt on the scientific consensus about climate change.38 Political mobilization 
through media shaping to disparage science has become a common tactic of our 
political life.39 Such common features of our politics, mostly themselves protected 
by the First Amendment, demonstrate the precious value of disciplined inquiry. 
                                                                                                                 
 
extent of ExxonMobil’s campaign to combat scientific knowledge about climate change long 
after it knew its validity. See Exxon: The Road Not Taken, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS, 
http://insideclimatenews.org/content/Exxon-The-Road-Not-Taken [http://perma.cc/W987-5AYP] 
(compiling several investigative articles regarding Exxon’s climate research and subsequent 
climate denial).  
 37.  
Review is an essential part of the IPCC process to ensure objective and complete 
assessment of the current information. In the course of the multi-stage review 
process—first by experts and then by governments and experts—both expert 
reviewers and governments are invited to comment on the accuracy and 
completeness of the scientific, technical and socio-economic content and the 
overall balance of the drafts. The circulation process among peer and government 
experts is very wide, with hundreds of scientists looking into the drafts to check 
the soundness of the scientific information contained in them. The Review 
Editors of the report (normally two per chapter) make sure that all comments are 
taken into account by the author teams. Review comments are retained in an open 
archive on completion of a report. 
Principles and Procedure, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization_procedures.shtml [http://perma.cc/7ZTN-5XVE]. 
 38. For a sample of the assault, see Patrick J. Michaels, The Climategate Whitewash 
Continues, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2010, 12:01 AM) http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052748704075604575356611173414140 [http://perma.cc/F67L-3TUD].  
 39. See NAOMI ORESTES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL 
OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 
(2010) (detailing successive episodes of interest groups exploiting media access to foster 
public doubt on scientific consensuses from tobacco to global warming).  
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Scholarship reveals the data, assumptions, and methods of analysis and offers them 
for careful review and critique by the best qualified peers, leading to progressively 
more convincing accounts of climate change.40 The political campaign denying 
climate change employs rhetoric of disparagement and innuendo and willfully 
inflates scraps of evidence to match its predetermined position.41 While such tactics 
are fair game in the political arena, and usually will be protected by the First 
Amendment, they do not aim for truth but for power.  
The conflict between the science of climate and its political opposition created an 
explicit problem of academic freedom in the 2010 subpoena served on the University 
of Virginia by a politically ambitious Attorney General of Virginia to turn over 
documents related to grants for climate research by a former professor, Michael 
Mann.42 The underlying claim was that Mann may have violated a state statute, the 
Fraud Against Taxpayers Act,43 in requests for grants to support his climate research 
by relying on past papers where “some of the conclusions . . . demonstrate a complete 
lack of rigor regarding the statistical analysis of the alleged data, meaning that the 
result reported lacked statistical significance without a specific statement to that 
effect.”44 The subpoena sent shock waves through the academic scientific 
community45 because litigation to disprove climate change could imperil 
investigation by subjecting research to evaluation by judges and juries and subjecting 
professors to ruinous liability and attorney’s fees for ordinary science. The 
University, usually represented by the Commonwealth’s Attorney General, obtained 
outside counsel and contested the demand. Leading higher education and civil 
liberties organizations filed an amicus brief highlighting the dangers to academic 
freedom.46 Virginia courts eventually quashed the subpoena on statutory grounds, 
interpreting the Act to exempt the state universities from such demands.47 Like the 
Colorado court’s decision in the Churchill case, the Virginia court strongly defended 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. This claim does not purport to deny the reality that advocates can in various ways 
“bend science,” to seek to generate “junk science” to support predetermined views. See 
generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL 
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (2008).  
 41. See id. at 181–228. Climate change denial may be becoming a rearguard action. See 
Katrina vanden Huevel, Cracks Appear in the Climate Change Deniers’ Defenses, WASH. 
POST (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cracks-appear-in-the
-climate-change-deniers-defenses/2015/06/15/8b0e42b4-137a-11e5-89f3-61410da94eb1_story
.html [https://perma.cc/5TKD-SFEM]. 
 42. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF VA., CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE 
DEMAND TO THE RECTOR AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA (2010) (CID No. 
3-MM), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents
/scientific_integrity/2010-9-29-Cuccinelli-CID.pdf [https://perma.cc/manage/vest/R8EA-3VR8]. 
 43. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-216.1 to -216.19 (2015). 
 44. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF VA., supra note 42 at 2.  
 45. E.g., Rosalind S. Helderman, U-Va. Goes to Court to Fight Cuccinelli's Subpoena of 
Ex-Professor's Documents, WASH. POST (May 28, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052705374.html [http://perma.cc/H6BV-3KTP]. 
 46. Brief for Amici Curiae American Ass’n of University Professors et al. in Support of 
Affirmance, Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 722 S.E.2d 626 (Va. 2012) 
(No. 102359), 2011 WL 9694348. 
 47. Cuccinelli, 722 S.E.2d at 630–31. 
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the principle of academic freedom while resting its decision on narrower grounds. It 
is a curious feature of judicial defenses of academic freedom that courts have placed 
their holdings on narrow or obscure grounds in some of the most significant cases.48 
The Virginia case highlights the public values of academic freedom. Mann’s 
research remains subject to testing and refutation by other scientists as further 
research tackles continuing questions about climate change. This process will yield 
both firmer knowledge and new questions. Academic freedom protects this process 
from assault by money and power. It thus furthers public values in both the actual 
knowledge created by scholarship and in the model that this process of determining 
knowledge provides for rational thinking. Disciplinary scholarship produces the most 
reliable knowledge available to us, because the facts, methods, and reasoning are 
transparent, the scholars are select and trained, and all results and approaches remain 
subject to criticism. For these reasons it is capable of producing new knowledge 
about many of things we need most to understand, such as climate, disease, and 
electronic data. Forming opinions about policies on the basis of reliable knowledge 
seems indisputably necessary for the survival of an advanced technological society.  
This is obviously the case with the physical sciences,49 but is true in only slightly 
different ways for the social sciences and humanities, where subjective perspective 
and normative judgment play inevitable roles. The truth values of subjects outside 
the physical sciences is a complex subject that Dean Post addressed in his remarks.50 
Literature scholars, for example, demand that interpretations be based on accurate 
texts and quotation, and correct understandings of secondary facts, as well as cultural 
and verbal sophistication. Thus, for example, Stanley Fish would not be a leading 
Milton scholar if his work were based on demonstrably false claims that Milton was 
closet Roman Catholic or had never read Virgil. Humanities scholars embrace truth 
values not just because those are the mores of the discipline but because they want 
to improve understanding of actual literary works and authors.  
The processes of scholarship also provide a model for thinking for educated 
leaders. Scholarship demands skepticism, humility, care, and honesty. Most of the 
students educated by scholars at universities will not themselves become scholars but 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967) 
(decided on vagueness); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (decided on state’s 
separation of powers). 
 49. For example, in recent years, academic scientists studying the environmental effects 
of natural gas drilling involving hydraulic fracturing (i.e., fracking) have faced significant 
pressures from industry, university donors, and others. See Paul Voosen, Fracking 
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citizens. To exercise that function they need both a foundation of reliable knowledge 
and an independent habit of mind sensitive to facts and persuasive arguments 
presented by others. Fish is right to criticize university teachers who seek to 
proselytize students to their political views rather than teach students the tools to 
form independent judgments.51 A liberal society necessarily presumes that 
individuals can freely govern themselves and exercise leadership by rising above a 
flood of prejudice and self-interest.52 As I have written previously:  
A pluralistic and democratic society can be distinguished from a 
fundamentalist or authoritarian one by persistent, competing arguments 
about both ends and means, respect for facts, and a willingness to revise 
assumptions. Commitments to rationality and freedom necessarily 
intertwine. A liberal education aims to teach people to engage arguments 
independently and critically, to separate good reasons from bullshit, and, 
crucially, to be open to revise their own positions upon learning new facts 
or hearing persuasive arguments. These are the methods of every 
academic discipline and essential learning for the leaders in the kind of 
society we wish to be. . . . The university is a holy place for a liberal 
society, one where the larger society’s values about discourse and 
knowledge are observed in a purer manner, which serves both as a release 
from and reproach to the compromised realities of politics and interests.53  
Fish insists that what justifies public support for academic work cannot be 
relevant for the content of academic freedom because it “has nothing to do . . . with 
what is distinctive about the academy. . . . One should not mistake an understanding 
of why something is supported for an understanding of what that something is.”54 
This formulation incoherently confuses a description of the content of an activity 
with a justification of its value. Those are different issues. Academic freedom has 
had to be established and protected by providing reasons why persons of power, 
whether priests, plutocrats, or attorneys general, should respect it. That requires an 
appeal to shared values.  
Fish does give some account of the value he finds in academic work. He emphasizes 
“the particular pleasures it offers to those who are drawn to it—chiefly the pleasures of 
solving puzzles and figuring out what makes something what it is—pleasures that 
would be made unavailable . . . if higher education were regarded as the extension of 
another enterprise.”55 This is lame. It puts scholarship and teaching on the same level 
as fantasy baseball. The pleasure of the participants in any activity does not provide 
a reason why outsiders who may find it incomprehensible or dangerous should 
refrain from interfering with it, let alone motivate them to support it with money or 
administrative talent. Nor does it matter, contrary to Fish, that individual scholars 
and teachers focus on satisfying disciplinary criteria rather than on external values 
like citizenship or democratic competence; what matters is that those disciplinary 
criteria embody liberal values of open engagement in rational disputes.  
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The Virginia case bears a striking resemblance to the U.S. Supreme Court’s first 
constitutional academic freedom case, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, where another 
state attorney general, investigating subversive persons, sought to question a guest 
lecturer about the content of his lecture at the University of New Hampshire.56 After 
the state courts affirmed the lecturer’s conviction for contempt in refusing to answer 
the questions, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on a peculiar technicality while 
emphasizing the danger to academic freedom from such a “governmental 
intervention in the intellectual life of a university.”57 Justice Frankfurter wrote: 
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made 
in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of 
hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit of 
understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social 
sciences, the concern of which is man and society. The problems that are 
the respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, 
psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely 
departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis, 
with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's 
good—if understanding be an essential need of society—inquiries into 
these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of 
reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible. Political 
power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued 
in the interest of wise government and the people's well-being, except for 
reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.58 
Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court:  
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities 
is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a 
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and 
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education 
is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet 
be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, 
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always 
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.59 
When I was younger, these passages from 1957 struck me as hyperbolic, even a 
little hysterical. But time has made the wisdom in them more compelling, even if the 
rhetoric seems dated. Just as political actors used red-baiting in the 1950s to mobilize 
political action, interested parties continue to seek to suppress scholarly research and 
critical analysis when threatening to their interests and ideologies. As much political 
discourse in our nation continues to employ provocative slogans and calculated 
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vituperation, powered by money and technology, and as universities themselves 
become ever more complex, bureaucratic, vocational, and commercial, scholarship 
and liberal education seem ever more essential to the promise of a humanistic 
future.60 Academic freedom has provided the defense of that promise.  
The American Association of University Professors’ 1915 Statement made a bold 
claim to the autonomy of science and scholarship from political opinion and 
economic interest.61 A more modest epistemology today may render the truth claims 
for scholarship relative rather than absolute. We may also see the commitment to 
disinterested truth more as an ethical precept than an operational reality. Nonetheless, 
contemporary controversies affirm the continuing value to society of painstaking 
academic inquiry after the truth, subject to careful expert critique, which will result 
in the improved understanding of complex realities upon which the human future 
may depend. Education according in these methods of inquiry and critique can foster 
adults able to distinguish between reason and desire. Fish’s minimalism reflects a 
loss of moral confidence in the social value of scholarship and teaching that imperils 
the ability of universities to contribute their most valuable assets to the wider world. 
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